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CustomersThis study examines a phenomenon in one nation's automobile insurance market where insurers adopt
diverse pricing strategies in this regulated industry that does not allow for such diversions—a homogeneous,
insurance industry in which a government authority sets the official pricing formula as well as all of the rating
factors. Insurers use a claim coefficient that reflects previous claim records of policyholder as an implicit
pricing tool to over/under charge new and repeat customers. The aim here is not so much to blow-the-whistle
on pricing practices that violate regulations but to describe execution details of the practices and their
outcomes. The results show that firm-level, systematic, price variances that occur differ from prices that
follow from applying regulated individual-claim coefficients. Based on the unique firm-level pricing
strategies, this study finds that some insurers are more nice to new customers and nasty to repeat customers
to increase market shares while other insurers earn high profits by being nasty to repeat customers. The
assumption that a behavioral primacy effect may exist in the market may guide some firms' pricing strategies.iwan, ROC (grant no. 98-2410-
c@fcu.edu.tw (C.-C. Liu),
l rights reserved.© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Traditional studies recognize that price dispersion for a homoge-
neous product can be an equilibrium outcome, in which consumers
play the key role in decision-making depending on search cost
(Burdett & Judd, 1983; Carlson & McAfee, 1983; Rob, 1985). Price
dispersion reflects complexity when applied to insurance market
where repeated purchasing behavior is present and multi-period
contracts are common (Berger et al., 1989; Dahlby and West, 1986;
Schlesinger & Schulenburg, 1991; and Seog, 2002). However, if the
government adopts price regulation, price dispersion for the same
type of insurance policy is supposed to vanish.
This study analyzes a phenomenon which is contrary to the above
rationale that despite government authority setting the official pricing
formula, as well as all of the rating factors, insurers adopt diverse
pricing strategies in an automobile insurance market. In such a
regulated market, consumers subjectively believe that the rating
methods are the same for all insurers as no differences in premiumsare supposed to occur for consumers purchasing automobile insur-
ance across the specific insurers.
Therefore, the search cost for the customer is zero as searching for
lower offer is not necessary. However, as this study shows, insurers
might under/over charge new/repeat customers by implicitly revising
one key element in the official rating formula, the claim coefficient,
which reflects the accumulated claim records of policyholder in the
previous three years.
Based on the official pricing formula and regulations (detailed
later), all else being equal, those who have more claims in the
accumulating period should receive higher claim coefficient in the
next year and pay a higher premium. Due to competition, as well as
pricing strategy, insurers might not adjust the insured's claim
coefficients accordingly. For example, insurers might treat policy-
holder nicely by hesitantly increasing premium in terms of higher
claim coefficient of the policyholder. Alternatively, insurers might
treat policyholder nastily by overcharging, such as not giving the
premium bonus deserved when no claims are filed in the previous
policy period.
The sustainability of different pricing strategies in a regulated
insurance market is due to one-way information asymmetry between
the insured and insurers. In this highly regulated market, insurers can
share histories of previous claims of each individual from authority's
intranet website while consumers do not know the implicit pricing




Under 20 1.89 1.70
20 or above but under 25 1.74 1.57
25 or above but under 30 1.15 1.04
30 or above but under 60 1.00 0.90
60 or above but under 70 1.07 0.96
70 or above 1.07 0.96
Source: Automobile insurance rating standard. Taipei: non-life insurance association of the
R.O.C. (2002).
969C.-S. Li et al. / Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 968–976This study shows that different pricing strategies are associated
with likely firm objectives that focus on profits versus market share.
Based on the empirical results, this paper explains the rationale
behind the findings in terms of marketing and pricing theory. One
strategic pricing theory, the behavioral primacy effect (i.e., the
influence of behavioral endowment effect; Thaler, 1980), fits the
explanation that customers tend to repeat-buy the initial brand that
they purchased more often than other brands when their use of the
first brand is favorable given the same purchasing environment
(Woodside & Uncles, 2005). Thus, some firms may adopt initial low-
price strategies that can increase the probability of new customers
trying their products and then increase their prices after these new
customers return-to-buy a second time or in later time periods.
In addition, from the “memory-based process” argument of
imprinting theory (first experience without considering alternative
options), most customers remember their best experience from the
first purchase. By applying the above theories to the automobile
insurance market, it insurers would undercharge for premiums to
gain the satisfaction of new customers.
However, when the insured renews the contract, the insurer may
not decrease the premium that should follow from a good driving
record (no claims) when offering such a bonus is standard practice in
the insurance market. Not offering the bonus reflects a higher
premium than should be applicable for the repeat buyers; insurers
applying such a strategy may expect that most repeat buyers are
insensitive to the overcharge. In other words, the insurance company
can earn excess profit from long-term high-premium contracts to
subsidize the losses from short-term low-premium contracts.
Kocas and Bohlmann (2008) stress that several empirical findings
about pricing strategies remain puzzling; for example, within the
samemarket, some small retailers decide to discount deeply, whereas
others forgo the price-sensitive switchers and price high. Theory and
research that explain such strategies are helpful. The present article
demonstrates that pricing variations counter to regulation require-
ments do occur across firms for a homogenous product in a highly
regulated market and provides explanations for their occurrence. In
addition, the findings of this paper highlight the incapability of
consumers to judge the fairness of insurance premiums which is
similar to the findings of Shapira and Venezia (2008) in that amateurs
(versus professionals) tend to buy too much insurance (low
deductible) due to the lack of ability to select a better deal.
Prior studies describe linkages from relative firm size to customer
retention rates and profitability (McGahan & Ghemawat, 1994). The
findings of the present study provide alternative views in that, in
addition to market share, different pricing policies (nice versus nasty)
differ in the abilities to attract customers and increase profits.
Following the identification of the topic and literature review in
Section 1, Section 2 describes the rating system and pricing of
insurance premiums in a highly-regulated market. Section 3 formally
states hypotheses that follow from the literature review. Section 4
describes the data to test the hypotheses. Section 5 presents the
analyses of the data. Section 6 discusses the findings and offers
limitations and conclusions.
2. The rating system for vehicle damage insurance in Taiwan
In Taiwan, the automobile insurance market has free entry but is
under highly regulated. In addition to the insurance companies,
various kinds of agents and providers play major roles in this market
(Bourgeon et al., 2008). Insurance authorities set up the standard
pricing formulas and base premiums. All insurers follow the official
formulas to determine the premium of individual policy based on
the specific characteristics of each policyholder. It is worth noting
that the regulation focuses on the formula itself, not the final
premium. The consequence is that insurers have some discrepancy
to use the detailed rating factors. The official rating formula tocalculate vehicle damage coverage premiums for all of the policy
options is as follows:
P = B × M × C ð1Þ
P denotes the actual premium, Bis the basic premium (including
unified loading), M and C are the manufacture coefficient and the
insured coefficient, respectively. In addition, the insured coefficient
involves a gender–age coefficient and a claim coefficient.
In Eq. (1), the basic premium varies according to the different
coverage types. Authority provides the detail ofmanufacture coefficient,
which relates with vehicle type and age, reflecting the car value or
replacement cost. In general, new or expensive cars versus old and
inexpensive cars have higher manufacture coefficients.
The calculation of insured coefficient is as follows:
insured coefficient = gender−age coefficient + claim coefficient ð2Þ
where the first factor represents immutable characteristics (primarily
gender and age) and the second factor reflects driving records.
Younger persons have a higher rating coefficient than older persons;
men have a higher gender–age coefficient than women. See Table 1.
The claim coefficient comes from the conversion of cumulative
claim point, which is the sum of no-claim point and claim point in the
past three years. That is,
Cumulative Claim Point = Non−claim Years Point
+ Claim Frequencies Point
ð3Þ
where “Non-claim Years Point” decreases 1 for each no claim year and
“Claim Frequencies Point” increases 1 for each additional claim except
for the first claim in a policy year. Multiplying the cumulative claim
point by 0.2 provides the claim coefficient. All insurers share the same
information about claim coefficients of the insured. Claim size plays
no role in the rating formula.
Intuitively, the formula to calculate the claim coefficient appears to
be complex. The insured customers are usually unable to clearly
remember the claim frequency of the past three years. They might
have difficulty realizing or be insensitive to how the claim number
results in the changes in premium, creating a kind of information
asymmetry. Therefore, some insurers may believe that they have an
incentive to adopt the pricing strategy of not adjusting the claim
coefficient regardless of whether claims are made or not, by believing
such a strategy is highly profitable. Under this situation, the high-risk
policyholders are better off but low-risk policyholders are worse off.
Customerswho staywith the same insurer formany years tend to be
low risk with fewer claims and insurers usually earn more profit from
long term customers (Cohen, 2008). Thus, a pricing strategy by
adjusting the claim coefficients systematically can serve as a competi-
tion tool for attracting new customers and discriminating against long
term customers who might simply be persistent in the same insurance
contract without switching. This study attempts to verify that some
firms actually implement this pricing strategy—nice to new customers











Sample Y 3 
Fig. 1. Illustration of sample policies comparisons.
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Based on the above conjectures, this study creates and tests the
following hypotheses. H1: Specific pricing strategy “nasty” (charging
higher prices than the regulated prices call for) to customers may be
more profitable than pricing strategy “nice” (charging lower prices
than the regulated prices call for) to customers. H2: Firms which
implement pricing strategy nice to both new and repeat customers
have higher market shares than firms implementing different pricing
strategies—some repeat customers do become aware of such a pricing
strategy and start to gravitate to firms offering lower prices. H3: Firms
nasty to both new and repeat customers have the lowest profits and
market shares—customers gravitate away from firms consistently
offering high prices.
H4a: Insurers differ systematically in their implemented pricing
strategies by customers' ages—some firms are particularly nastier
versus nicer to young and old customers more so than middle-aged
customers while other firms follow the government regulations
relating to setting premiums by age. The rationales are: insurers differ
in the importance they place on age in setting premiums—some firms
seek young customers more than others by offering low premiums in
an attempt to boost market shares. Other firms systematically may
follow the regulation for setting premiums for young customers to
discourage their purchase to achieve high profits (Li et al., 2010).
H4b: Firms that implement unique pricing strategies by age have the
highest profits andmarket shares. Such age-unique strategies respond
to customers who are most likely to be price sensitive—middle-aged
customers. Middle-aged customers are more likely to shop around for
low prices while young and old customers are happier to just be able





























Fig. 2. The claim ratio for insurers by contract relation, 2006 policy year.4. Data
This study uses a unique dynamic data set of individual automobile
vehicle damage insurance policy and claim data for the policy years
2004 to 2006 from the Taiwan Insurance Institute, a semi-official
organization responsible for collecting insurance statistics and
financial data for insurers. The data include complete car insurance
information from insurers, including characteristics of policyholders,
vehicles, claim coefficient, claim drivers, claim frequency, claim
amount, and contract details.
To examine the strategy of claim coefficient adjustment for the
insurer, this study analyzes the data of the insured purchasing the
major policy type, comprehensive coverage without deductible, for
the first time with new cars in the 2004 policy year (105,125 policies
in total) and traces the claim records and claim coefficients assigned
by the insurers in the period 2004–2006. Since the insured usually buy
no vehicle damage insurance after owning a new car for one or two
years, or switch insurance policy types in the subsequent years, the
total samples is dramatically reduced and the insurance policy can be
any one of the above four types. In the 2006 policy year, 26,495
policies remain, forming the basis of analysis in this study.
To have an equal standard to compare the pricing strategies among
the insurers, this study sets up the 2006 policy year as the benchmark
and constructs three samples as follows. Sample Y1 includes
customers who have only one year of a contract with the insurer in
2006 policy year, indicating that they switch to different insurer at the
end of 2005, as the dotted lines in Fig. 1 show.
Sample Y2 consists of the insured that stay with the same insurer
for two years up to 2006 (included), such as the contracting policy
years from 2005 to 2006 or 2004 to 2006. Dashed lines in Fig. 2
describe this case. (Sample Y2 does not include those who stay with
the same insurer in 2004 and 2005 policy years but switch to anotherinsurer in 2006. Instead, they are in sample Y1 as the benchmark of
comparison is the premium in 2006.)
Sample Y3 includes those who have three years of contracts with
the same insurer from 2004 to 2006 policy years, as the straight lines
in Fig. 1 show. In this sample, the insured sticks with the same insurer
without switching.
Based on the above setting, this analysis treats sample Y1 as a short
term relation, while samples Y2 and Y3 are a long term
relation. Table 2 lists the data of policy distribution for the top ten
insurers ranked by sales of policy for new cars in the 2004 policy year
that includes approximately 90% of the total market shares. The four-
firm concentration ratio (C4) is close to 50%, implying that the
concentration ratio of automobile insurance market in Taiwan is very
high. In general, renewed contracts account for only one half of the
vehicle damage insurance market.
In addition, those who renewed might also switch the types of
coverage. Table 2 also indicates that the rankings of market shares of
the policies among insurers are almost the same for each insurer for
both short-term and long-term contracts.5. Analysis
This section includes findings from several empirical tests. The first
is to investigate whether a difference exists between actual claim
coefficient recorded in the data set and ruled claim coefficient derived
from the official formula. Second, the major target is to compute the
consumer niceness index (CNI) for each insurer from the value that is
the difference between number of under-adjusted policies and the
number of over-adjusted policies over the total policies. After the
calculation of the operating performance for each insurer, the final
Table 2
Policies distributed by company and contract years.
Insurer 2004 policy year
(comprehensive policy)
2006 policy year
(all types of coverage)





1 14,740 14 4,969 1,201 1,603 2,165
2 14,529 13.8 3,020 606 758 1656
3 13,365 12.7 2,872 632 752 1488
4 9,436 8.9 2,291 743 623 925
5 9,109 8.7 1,691 482 493 716
6 8,601 8.2 1,685 449 501 735
7 7,646 7.3 1,584 590 526 466
8 6,063 5.8 1,919 678 619 622
9 5,348 5.1 1,467 502 484 481
10 3,814 3.6 659 256 262 141
Others 12,474 11.9 4,338 1,528 1,737 1,073
Source: Original data from analysis of Taiwan Insurance Institute records.
971C.-S. Li et al. / Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 968–976analysis examines the relationship between the insurer's strategy and
the operating performance.
5.1. Actual claim versus ruled claim coefficients
To obtain the accurate claim coefficient for each policyholder, this
study selects the automobile insurance policies sold in 2004 for those
purchasing a new car and without previous claims. Based on the
official formula in Eq. (3), Table 3 shows all possible ruled claim
coefficients based on the distribution of the dataset.
In Table 3, starting from 2004, all samples are the first time buyers
of new cars and automobile insurance. The claim coefficients are all
zero (column 1). Column 2 displays the possible number of claims in
2004. Column 3 shows the value of claim coefficients corresponding to
number of claims in column 2. Column 4 shows the possible number
of claims in 2005, based on the first year's (2004) claim experience in
column 2. Column 5 indicates the accurate claims coefficient that the
insurers should use in 2006 based on the accumulated number of
claims in 2004–2005.
Based on all of the cases in Table 3, having the same claim
coefficients for two years is possible (from 2004 to 2005 or 2004 to
2006) whereas having the same claim coefficients for three years is
impossible (2004–2006). For example, if the insured incurs only one
claim after obtaining policy in 2004, no change occurs in claimTable 3
All possible ruled claim coefficients, 2004–2006.
2004 2005 2006























3 0.4 0 0.2
1 0.6
2 0.8
3 1.0coefficient in 2005. On the other hand, one additional claim in 2005
should result in a 0.2 increase in claim coefficient which is equivalent
to the case with three claims in 2004 and no claim in 2005. Another
case is that the insured has no claim in 2004 but has two claims in
2005. Then, the claim coefficients are equal for 2004 and 2006.
Therefore, for most of the cases, insurers should adjust the actual
claim coefficient every year whether or not the insured has incurred
an accident in the past three years. For the policy without claim, the
insured should receive lower actual claim coefficient and gain the
benefit of the deduction of the premium. On the contrary, for the
claimed policy, the actual claim coefficient should be higher resulting
in premium increase. The major research objective is to estimate the
“ruled claim coefficient” derived by the official formula and to
examine the actual claim coefficient recorded in the data set
corresponding to each insured by contract relation with insurers.
To test whether or not the actual claim coefficient recorded in the
data set is different from ruled claim coefficient, this study divides all
of the policies into three categories. First, if the actual claim coefficient
is equal to the ruled claim coefficient, then the policy is a “correctly
adjusted” policy. Second, “over adjusted” (“under adjusted”) policy
means that the actual claim coefficient is higher than (lower than) the
ruled claim coefficient. Thus, for the under adjusted situation, the
premium will be lower which is advantageous to the consumer and
for the over adjusted situation, the premium will be higher which is
disadvantageous to the consumer.
Table 4 shows the policy distribution of adjusted record by
company and contract years for policies purchased in 2006 policy
year. The highest value of the ratio of correctly adjusted policies
increases over time. For example, the highest ratios for samples Y1,
Y2, and Y3 are around 50% (insurer 3), 65% (insurer 10), and 70%
(insurer 7), respectively, as Table 4 shows. The highest values of the
ratio of over-adjusted policies also increase during the three policy
years from 59% (insurer 4) in Y1, to 66% (insurer 4) in Y2 and 69% in
Y3 (insurer 5).
Fig. 2 shows the claim ratio of the insurer by contract relation. On
average, the claim ratio ranges around 15% to 20% for most insurers.
Compared to other insurers, two insurers (insurer 8 and insurer 10)
appear to be nicer to customers due to lower claim ratio of around 15%
to 20%. For insurer 5, the claim ratio is extremely low (around 2%).
Fig. 3 displays the tendency of correctly-adjusted policies which is an
increasing ratio over time. Only a few insurers (insurers 4, 5 and 8)
reveal the opposite direction.
The findings from Figs. 2 and 3 imply that the longer the
relationship with the same insurer, the more likely the acquisition
of accurate records that reflect the customers' true risk. Fig. 4 presents
the ratio of over-adjusted policies among insurers by contract years. A
Table 4







N1 Correct Over Under N2 Correct Over Under N3 Correct Over Under
% % % % % % % % %
1 4969 1201 511 216 474 1603 750 141 712 2165 1402 53 710
43% 18% 39% 47% 9% 44% 65% 2% 33%
2 3020 606 242 119 245 758 331 97 330 1656 916 40 700
40% 20% 40% 44% 13% 44% 55% 2% 42%
3 2872 632 310 132 190 752 350 93 309 1488 895 46 547
49% 21% 30% 47% 12% 41% 60% 3% 37%
4 2291 743 195 435 113 623 137 413 73 925 178 591 156
26% 59% 15% 22% 66% 12% 19% 64% 17%
5 1691 482 196 85 201 493 252 185 56 716 220 496 0
41% 18% 42% 51% 38% 11% 31% 69% 0%
6 1685 449 168 80 201 501 198 37 266 735 460 22 253
37% 18% 45% 40% 7% 53% 63% 3% 34%
7 1582 590 268 138 184 526 283 57 186 466 328 14 124
45% 23% 31% 54% 11% 35% 70% 3% 27%
8 1919 678 213 230 235 619 207 318 94 622 182 412 28
31% 34% 35% 33% 51% 15% 29% 66% 5%
9 1467 502 206 89 207 484 190 91 203 481 230 14 237
41% 18% 41% 39% 19% 42% 48% 3% 49%
10 659 256 112 46 98 262 170 31 61 141 97 34 10
44% 18% 38% 65% 12% 23% 69% 24% 7%
972 C.-S. Li et al. / Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 968–976negative relationship exists between the ratio of correctly-adjusted
policies and the ratio of over-adjusted policies for four insurers with
around 50% of the market share.
Therefore, the decreasing trend in Fig. 3 reflects the increasing
trend in Fig. 4 for over-adjusted policies over time. For the trend of the
ratio of under-adjusted policies, the ratio of short-term contract for
most of the insurers is within the range of 30% to 40%, while for long-
term contracts, the variance becomes larger, around 10% to 45% for Y2
and around 0% to 50% for Y3, as Fig. 5 shows.
5.2. Measuring the consumer niceness index (CNI)
To understand the general trend in Table 4 and by taking into
account the three types of claim coefficient adjustment patterns, this
article derives two quantity indexes which can reflect the degree of
niceness to customers by insurers.









































Fig. 3. The ratio of “Correct Adjustment” policies for insurers (firms 1–10).where Nicen = number of customers receiving premiums lower than
the regulation premium; Nastyn = number of customers receiving
premiums higher than the regulation premium with the minimum
value equal to 1.0; and N = total customers receiving policies.
Equation (4) indicates that when the number of under adjusted policies
(customers receiving premiums lower than the regulation premium) is
greater than the number of over adjusted policies (customers receiving
premiums higher than the regulation premium), the CNIA will be
positive.
Conversely, when the number of under adjusted policies is less
than the number of over adjusted policies, the CNIA becomes negative.
Therefore, a positive (negative) CNIA implies that the insurer treats
customers nicely (nastily) overall. Columns (2)–(5) in Table 5
illustrate the CNIA by insurer and contract relation which shows
that for one year contract (Y1) in column (2), the CNIA is positive for
all insurers except one (insurer 4). The positive evidence indicates
that most insurers are friendly to their new customers. However, for
the long-term contract (Y2 or Y3), more insurers have negative values
of CNIA. For example, there are three and four insurers for Y2 and Y3





































































Fig. 5. the ratio of “under adjustment” policies for insurers (firms 1–10).
Table 5


















1 0.21 0.36 0.30 2.19 5.05 13.40 A
2 0.21 0.17 0.40 2.06 3.40 17.50 A
3 0.09 0.29 0.34 1.44 3.32 11.89 A
4 −0.43 −0.55 −0.47 0.25 0.18 0.26 D
5 0.24 −0.26 −0.69 2.36 0.30 0.002 C
6 0.27 0.46 0.31 2.51 7.19 11.50 A
7 0.08 0.25 0.24 1.33 3.26 8.86 A
8 0.01 −0.36 −0.62 1.02 0.30 0.07 C
9 0.24 0.23 0.46 2.33 2.23 16.93 A
10 0.2 0.08 −0.17 2.13 1.97 0.29 B
Note: CNIA =
Nicen−Nastyn




is Relative Consumer Niceness Index.
Table 6
Insurer's strategy, CNI, Gross Profit Ratio (GPR) and market share, 2006 policy year.
(1) Strategy type All customer relationship
Short term Long term (5)




A Nice for all CNIAN0 CNIAN0 CNIAN0 3




B Nice, nice, nasty CNIAN0 CNIAN0 CNIAb0 10
(CNIRN1) (CNIRN1) (CNIRb1)
C Nice, nasty, nasty CNIAN0 CNIAb0 CNIAb0 5
(CNIRN1) (CNIRb1) (CNIRb1) 8
D Nasty to all CNIAb0 CNIAb0 CNIAb0 4
(CNIRb1) (CNIRb1) (CNIRb1)
Hypothesis test
H1: Pricing strategies “nasty” to customers are more profitable than “nice” to customers.
The average GPR of insurers adopting strategy A = the average GPR of insurers adoptin
H2: Firms implement pricing strategies nice to both new and repeat customers have high
than firms implementing different pricing strategies. (Null hypothesis: The average ma
adopting strategy A = the average market share of insurers adopting strategies B, C, an
H3: Firms nasty to both new and repeat customers have the lowest profits and market sh
(Null hypothesis: Firms nasty to both new and repeat customers have the same profits
Note. Other possible strategies do not occur, for example, CNIAb0 for Y1 with CNIAN0 for Y
973C.-S. Li et al. / Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 968–976As absolute difference scores do not account for the relative size on
over/under charge (see Teas 1993, 1994 for theoretical and practical
problems in using difference scores), the analysis also uses a second
formula to compute net firm-level stance toward nice and nasty as





The CNIR in equation (5) maintains a positive ratio and is less than
1 when the number of nice cases is smaller than that of nasty cases.
The CNIR index is greater than 1 when nice cases are more than the
nasty ones. A direct linkage exists between absolute and relative
consumer niceness indexes in that positive CNIA implies that CNIRN1
and negative CNIA corresponds to CNIRb1.
Columns (5)–(7) in Table 5 show the results of calculation of CNIR.
For insurers 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7, CNIR values increase with contract years,
representing that these insurers are more likely to be nice to long-
term customers. However, some insurers (insurers 5 and 8) show
reverse trend and with increasing nastiness in association with
increased contract years.
5.3. Pricing strategy and contractual relations
To further analyze the interaction among the price strategies,
contract relation, and the operating performance of the insurer, this
study establishes four possible price-relation marketing strategies
based on the data distribution: Type A, insurers adopt niceness
strategy for all years, therefore the consumers benefit both in the
short term (Y1) and long term (Y2 and Y3); Type B, the pricing
strategies of the insurers are nice, nice, and nasty, the consumers
benefit in Y1 and Y2 but not in the long-term Y3; Type C, the pricing
policies are nice, nasty, nasty; and Type D, insurers are nasty for all
years and the consumers do not benefit in the long or the short term.
Other possible strategies do not occur. Columns (1) to (5) in Table 6
show the distribution of insurers in terms of pricing strategy.Market share (%)
(6)
er GPR (7) (8)













g strategies B, C, and D.)
p=0.0629
er market shares
rket share of insurers
d D.)





Market shares: p=0.4351 (all policies)
p=0.4796 (comprehensive policy)
2 with CNIA for Y3 does not occur.



























Fig. 7. Y2: the Consumer Nice Index (CNIA), the contract years, and gross profit ratio.
974 C.-S. Li et al. / Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 968–976As Table 6 shows, six out of ten insurers adopt strategy type A,
treating their customers nicely regardless of the contract years. Two
out of ten insurers adopt strategy type C and are nice to their new
customers while nasty to their repeat buyers. Only one insurer applies
strategy type (nice, nice, then nasty) and one other insurer applies
strategy type D (nasty to all customers).
5.4. Gross profit ratio (GPR) and pricing strategy
Due to the competition in the insurance market, insurers might
choose a specific pricing strategy to attract customers based on
insurers' evaluation of the marketing environment. In addition,
insurers might set up a target to maximize the market share or
profitability. Thus, analyzing the relationship between market share
and firm's performance with the price strategies is natural. This study
uses the index of the gross profit ratio (GPR) to compare insurers'
operation efficiency.
Gross Profit Ratio ðGPRÞ = 1− total loss
total premium
: ð6Þ
For consistency of effective comparison, this study calculates GPR
based on the 2006 policy year data for each insurer in the sample which
includes only policies with comprehensive coverage without deduct-
ible. The comparison does not take into account operation costs and
investment profit which are usually common factors. The reason for
doing so is to identify the pure effects of pricing strategies on focused
group of policyholders. Column (6) in Table 6 shows the results of GPR,
ranging from the lowest of 0.48 to the highest of 0.98. To verify if the
nasty strategy implies better profit (Hypothesis H1), this study tests the
null hypothesis that the equality of GPR between groups without
nasty strategy (type A) and with nasty strategy (type B, C, and D). The t
statistic shows that the average of GPR for insurers with nasty strategy
is significantly higher at 10% level (p value=0.0629), supporting
hypothesis H1.
To connect pricing strategywithmarket shares, this study calculates
two kinds of shares by using all insurance policies (column 7) and
sample policies of comprehensive without deductible (column 8). The
patterns of these two market shares among all insurers are similar. In
Table 6, insurers that choose to undercharge the insured both in the
short and long-run (Type A strategy) are more likely to have higher
market shares with average of 9.85% (all policies), 9.65% (sample
policies) and a moderate average GPR of 0.57. On the contrary, insurers
that undercharge the new policyholders but overcharge the renewing
ones (type C strategy) tend tohavehigherGPR (with anaverage of 0.95)
and moderate market share (with an average of 8.15% of all policies).
Only one insurer adopts severe pricing strategy (type D) by
overcharging all insured and has moderate GPR (0.56) and market
share (10.7%). However, to test hypothesis H2 in that, firms implement
pricing strategy nice to both new and repeat customers have higher
market shares than firms implementing different pricing strategies, the




























Fig. 6. Y1: The Consumer Nice Index (CNIA), the contract years, and gross profit ratio.policies and comprehensive policies, respectively.). The hypothesis H2
does not hold.
The gross profit ratios (column 6 in Table 6) show that strategy
type B (nice, nice, then nasty) outperforms strategy type A (nice to all
customers) and all other strategies. Given that microeconomic theory
calls for the firm to focus on profits as its principle objective
(Armstrong and Collopy, 1996), the findings support strategy type B
over strategy types A, C, or D. However, strategy type A delivers higher
market shares than strategy type C. Some strategists might argue that
in the long run, strategy type A is best because this strategy might
retain customers more successfully than other strategies. Table 6 also
shows that strategy type D receives relatively lower profit but
moderate market share. The t test supports hypothesis H3 in that all
other strategy types outperform type D in terms of GPR at 10%
significant level (p value=0.0548). However, when it comes to the
market share, strategy type D does not necessarily have the lowest
ratio (p value=0.4351 and 0.4796 in terms of all policies and
comprehensive policies, respectively.)
To demonstrate the relation between GPR and consumer niceness
index CNIA, Figs. 6, 7 and 8 show the results by contract year. In
particular, Fig. 6 indicates that only one insurer is in the left zone,
having negative CNIA but moderate GPR for Y1 contract. However, the
higher the numbers of contract years, themore insurers join in the left
zone to adopt the nasty strategy as Figs. 7 and 8 show. More
importantly, those insurers with negative CNIA (left zone) receive
relatively higher profits compared with that those in the right zone.
Age is one of the major rating factors in automobile insurance. One
might be curious about whether or not insurers adopt different
pricing strategies for different age groups that do not follow the
official rating formula. Table 7 demonstrates the results by listing the
strategy type based on age. The group aged 30 to 60 represents the
majority of the customers and these customers experience the same
strategy type distribution as that using all data.
An interesting result is that three insurers (7, 8, and 10) indeed
adopt different strategies for policyholders aged less than 30. Insurers
8 and 10 switch their strategy to become nasty for all years for
younger group while remaining nice to the new customers in the
majority age group. In addition, insurer 7 reveals a new strategy,
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Fig. 8. Y3: The Consumer Nice Index (CNIA), the contract years, and gross profit ratio.
Table 7
Insurer's strategy of different age group by company.
(1) Strategy type Insurer
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Customer Customer Customer Customer
(all data) (ageb30) (30≤ageb60) (age≥60)
(% of customers) (100%) (12%) (84%) (4%)
A Nice for all years 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3,
6, 7, 9 6, 9 6, 7, 9 6, 7, 9, 10
B Nice, nice, nasty 10 – 10 –
C Nice, nasty, nasty 5, 8 5 5, 8 5
D Nasty for all years 4 4, 8, 10 4 4, 8
E Nasty, nice, nice – 7 – –
Hypothesis test
H4a: Insurers differ systematically in their implemented pricing strategies by customers' ages.
(Null hypothesis: there is no difference on pricing strategies by ages among insurers.)
Kruskal-Wallis test K =1
(critical value:χ2, 0.12 = 4.6052)
H4b: Firms that implement unique pricing strategies by age have the highest profits and market shares.
(Null hypotheses: firms that implement unique pricing strategies by age have the same profits and
market share with other firms.).
Profit: p=0.2233 market shares: p=0.2117
(all policies) p=0.3613 (comprehensive policy)
975C.-S. Li et al. / Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 968–976different strategies for each age group in which older customers
obtain the best deal (strategy A).
To test hypothesis H4a, if insurers differ systematically in pricing
strategies by customers' ages, this paper adopts Kruskal-Wallis test.
The result shows that the χ2 test fails to reject the null hypothesis and
that there is no significant difference on pricing strategies. Similarly,
the hypothesis H4b, firms that implement unique pricing strategies by
age have the highest profits and market shares, also does not hold.6. Discussion, limitations, and conclusion
Considering some rationales based on the evidence, a natural
question arises. How does price dispersion exists under symmetric
information? Intuitively, with full information, a multi-period
competitive contract where the risk types of customers are observable
consists of a one-period contract repeated in each period. The setting
of premium will fully reflect the customers' own real risks. No gains
should occur for multi-period competitive contracting (Cooper &
Hayes, 1987; Townsend, 1982). The insurers do not have any
information-based market power for sharing information among
insurers. No additional incentives exist for customers with good claim
history to stay with the same insurers to gain the benefits from the
deduction of the premium or for customers with bad claim history to
switch to other insurers to avoid premium increases.
However, in the real world, if the insured is insensitive to the
changes in premium when they renew a long-term contract, then the
price-setting strategies by the insurer might differ for first-time
customers (short-term contracts) and repeat customers (long-term
contracts) even under full information.
Alternatively, the rationale for the insurers to undercharge the
insured connects to a practical issue — time lag between pricing and
claims filing. Prior research (Li et al., 2008) based on the Taiwan
automobile insurancemarket finds extensive customer claims-filings in
the last policy month. However, policyholders usually renew insurance
contracts one or twomonths before their expiration. Therefore, offering
a price without taking into account the claims filed in the last policy
month is possible. But, for long term customers, the insurer should not
repeat the same pattern for two years. However, Table 6 shows that
under charging indeed occurs for two years for some insurers.
If the time lag problem on premium adjusting is not severe,
another plausible reason to undercharge is to be nice to increase
market share. Based on the economies of scale of insurance industry,
the more policies sold, the less management cost-per-policy share.
The increase in market share at the cost of undercharging might beprofitable eventually. For example, the 3 largest insurers, based on the
sample data, adopt strategy type A (nice for all years).
From the demand side, given the regulated pricing formula, why
do the insured accept an overcharged insurance premium? In fact,
most policyholders likely have no idea about the rules and regulations
governing pricing relevant to their policies, and other pricing factors.
Consumers appear to buy insurance products from agents without
asking the details about how premiums are calculated relevant to
their insurance purchases (Taylor &Woodside, 1981). Similarly, Carlin
(2009) discusses a case in which the complexity in retail financial
market makes consumers more ignorant and provides the incentive for
firms to adopt price increase strategy. In addition, consumers in Taiwan
may have the illusion of psychologicalmonopoly (Sundie et al., 2008) in
mind without seeking the second insurer or agent.
In Taiwan, the ignorance of bonus–malus system of automobile
insurance leads to the insured accepting a renewed premiumwhich is
the same as the previous year is even if the insurer should reduce
premium due to no claims. Insurer 4 might belong to such a case so
that even though it is nasty to all it retains a relatively high market
share (10.7% for all polices and 11.9% for sample polices).
Limitations to the present study include its focus on one country.
Replication research is necessary to confirm the extent of the relevance
of the findings to additional national contexts. Also, while pricing
strategies are the key issue in this study, factors such as company size,
capital, underwriting policy, and other factors might also play some
roles relating to GPR and market share, but the study of these potential
influences is absent from this study. Future research needs to consider
possible interactions of these factors on the findings of the present
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